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Situation concerning Western Sahara

Report of the Secretary-General

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I. Summary

1. The situation in Western Sahara continued to be characterized by tensions and low-intensity hostilities between Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguía el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO). The adoption of Security Council resolution 2797 (2025), however, generated renewed momentum in the political process led by the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara, Staffan de Mistura. During the first quarter of 2026, the Personal Envoy co-facilitated with the United States of America, as penholder in the Security Council for Western Sahara, three rounds of direct negotiations between Morocco, Frente POLISARIO, Algeria and Mauritania, for the first time in seven years. Subsequently, the United Nations and the United States continued to work together with the parties to develop a road map towards a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution. While these efforts have been hindered by the continuation of military activities and the lack of trust between the parties, prospects remain for meaningful progress towards the resolution of the dispute.

II. Key developments

A. Update on the political process

2. In response to requests by the Personal Envoy that the parties expand on their positions, on 20 October 2025 Frente POLISARIO transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a document entitled “Proposal of the Frente POLISARIO for a mutually acceptable political solution that provides for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara and restores regional peace and stability”, elaborating on its 2007 proposal for “post-referendum guarantees”. At the request of Frente POLISARIO, the document was also shared with members of the Security Council (see S/2025/664). Morocco also developed a “draft autonomy statute”, elaborating on its 2007 autonomy proposal. This document was shared with the Personal Envoy and the United States, as Co-Chairs, as well as with the participants in the negotiations, namely Frente POLISARIO, Algeria and Mauritania, in January 2026. It was not circulated publicly as it is explicitly intended as a basis for negotiations rather than an outcome agreement.

3. Following the adoption of Security Council resolution 2797 (2025), King Mohamed VI of Morocco proclaimed 31 October as Unity Day, a national holiday in Morocco. The initial reaction of Frente POLISARIO came in a statement on 31 October, which noted favourably that the resolution “calls upon the two parties to engage in the discussions without preconditions and leaves the door open for discussing all proposals to support a final mutually acceptable solution”, while also highlighting that “some elements contained in the resolution, which constitute a very dangerous and unprecedented departure from the basis upon which the Security Council has addressed Western Sahara in line with the principles enshrined in the UN Charter”.

4. At a press conference on 5 November, the Personal Envoy described resolution 2797 (2025) as “significant” because it demonstrated renewed international energy to resolve the conflict. Welcoming the proactive engagement of the United States as penholder in the Security Council, he highlighted that the resolution provides “a framework for negotiations” but “does not prescribe an outcome”. The outcome, he said, would be the result of negotiations between the parties undertaken in good faith. He then called on all parties to participate in renewed political negotiations, noting that engaging in negotiations did not mean automatically accepting their outcome.

5. In early 2026, the Personal Envoy jointly relaunched direct negotiations with all interested parties, alongside the United States. He co-chaired three rounds of talks with the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations, Michael Waltz, with active support from the Senior Advisor for Arab and African Affairs to the United States President, Massad Boulos, and other senior United States officials. Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania were represented throughout by their Ministers for Foreign Affairs, while Frente POLISARIO was represented by its foreign policy chief. The negotiations saw in-depth discussions among participants with a view to achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable solution to the dispute, taking as a basis for the talks Morocco's autonomy proposal, in accordance with resolution 2797 (2025).

6. The first round of negotiations was held in Washington, D.C., on 18 and 19 January 2026. During this round, Morocco presented the expanded version of its 2007 autonomy proposal and responded to comments and questions from other participants and the Co-Chairs. Morocco further indicated a willingness to work with Frente POLISARIO on the negotiation and implementation of a mutually acceptable solution, in such a way that the outcome would be jointly developed and owned by all parties to the conflict. Frente POLISARIO presented its own ideas and suggestions for the resolution of the dispute, based on the expanded proposal that it had shared with the Secretary-General on 20 October 2025. This round of negotiations served to clarify positions and begin to build trust between the parties.

7. A second round of negotiations was held in Madrid on 8 and 9 February 2026. During this round, participants examined the establishment of a Transitional Council, which would not only manage various transitional processes, but also provide a space to negotiate the details of a just, lasting and mutually acceptable solution. The role of international stakeholders and guarantees of implementation were debated at length. Ideas and proposals on resource-sharing; amnesty and reconciliation; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and security measures; and electoral systems were also introduced. During this round and in subsequent sessions, Mauritania highlighted the need to form a commission to clarify in a consensual manner the final and permanent international borders of the disputed territory.

8. At the request of the participants, the United Nations and United States teams worked together during and after this round of negotiations to draft a preliminary framework agreement on a possible transitional phase, and potential compromise positions on the areas outlined above. The teams drafted several documents in this regard to be presented during a third round.

9. A third round of negotiations was held in Washington, D.C., on 23 and 24 February. This round allowed for in-depth discussion on the Transitional Council as well as other elements introduced by the United Nations and United States teams. The round also opened a debate on the questions of self-determination and sovereignty of the disputed territory, which remain the most contentious elements in the search for a mutually acceptable solution. In view of the significant divergences, the Co-Chairs decided that these questions would need to be addressed with the parties individually in order to identify possible solutions. Throughout the negotiations, the Personal Envoy underscored that any autonomy proposal for Western Sahara should meet the highest international standards, that a transition to genuine autonomy would need to be backed by strong international guarantees, and that any resolution to the conflict must include a meaningful process of consultation with the Sahrawi people in accordance with the principle of self-determination.

10. Following these three rounds of high-level negotiations, the Personal Envoy remained in regular contact with all interested parties, in close coordination with the United States as Co-Chair of the negotiations. This engagement has been undertaken

with a view to building consensus towards a mutually acceptable political solution that provides for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara. In this regard, the Personal Envoy met with Frente POLISARIO on 23 March in Brussels, with Algeria on 1 April also in Brussels, and with Morocco on 21 and 23 April in New York. The Personal Envoy then travelled to Tindouf for meetings with Frente POLISARIO leadership, including with its Secretary-General, Brahim Ghali, on 7 and 8 June. He subsequently met with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria, Ahmed Attaf, on 15 June in Algiers, and the President of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Mohamed Ould Ghazouni, on 18 June in Nouakchott.

11. In these discussions, the Personal Envoy's interlocutors assured him of their commitment to the process and underscored the historic nature of the progress achieved. They stressed that the process of consensus-building should be given the opportunity to succeed. The lack of trust, particularly between Morocco and Frente POLISARIO, was highlighted as a major obstacle to finding a mutually acceptable solution that could be implemented. In this respect, the Personal Envoy underscored the importance of trust-building initiatives in the short term, and strong international guarantees in the longer term.

12. Following these consultations with the parties, the Personal Envoy has revisited with his Co-Chair the areas of relative consensus and prepared a revised draft framework agreement for a transitional period. If adopted, this framework agreement could provide a basis for negotiations on a detailed model of self-governance for Western Sahara and a meaningful process of consultation for the people of Western Sahara to move forward.

13. In accordance with Security Council resolutions 2703 (2023), 2756 (2024) and 2797 (2025), the Personal Envoy, together with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara, Alexander Ivanko, gave briefings to the Council on 10 October 2025 and 23 April 2026 in closed consultations. On both occasions, he received broad support from members of the Council for his efforts. While in New York, the Personal Envoy met with senior United Nations officials as well as representatives of Morocco, Frente POLISARIO, Algeria, Mauritania and other Member States, including members of the Security Council.

14. In response to resolution 2797 (2025), several Member States clarified or altered their positions on Western Sahara. Sweden and Switzerland expressed support for Morocco's autonomy plan as a credible basis for negotiations, while Honduras and Mali suspended their recognition of the "Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic". The Plurinational State of Bolivia also suspended diplomatic relations with the "Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic" in February 2026. Canada and Madagascar explicitly reiterated support for Morocco's autonomy plan, while the European Union updated its collective position in January 2026 to state that negotiations should take the autonomy proposal as a basis.

15. In the context of his engagement with other Member States and partners, the Personal Envoy also met with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain in Madrid on 9 February and briefed senior European and Canadian officials on the negotiations, together with the Co-Chair, Mr. Waltz, on 26 March in Geneva. On the same day, the Personal Envoy met the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to discuss durable solutions for Sahrawi refugees. He, together with Mr. Boulos, also met with the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Norway in Oslo on 10 June. Additionally, during his visit to Algiers, the Personal Envoy met with representatives of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States, as well as other Member States, on 16 and 17 June. All interlocutors highlighted their support for the United Nations-led process and their

desire to see it lead to a successful and sustainable resolution of the question of Western Sahara.

B. Situation on the ground

16. The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) continued to receive reports alleging shootings by Frente POLISARIO towards units of the Royal Moroccan Army at or near the berm, and alleging strikes conducted by uncrewed aerial vehicles of the Royal Moroccan Army east of the berm.

17. On 13 November, the Royal Moroccan Army wrote to the Force Commander, highlighting the "continued hostile activities of the … Polisario Front" and reaffirming "the importance of full respect for the ceasefire". In his response letter dated 14 November 2025, the Force Commander reiterated the call by MINURSO on the parties to "put in effect a cessation of hostilities to create an atmosphere propitious for dialogue" in line with Security Council resolution 2797 (2025), which underlined the importance of respecting the ceasefire and avoiding any act that jeopardizes the political process. On 14 November, the Special Representative wrote a similar letter to Frente POLISARIO, asking it to "put in effect a cessation of hostilities to create an atmosphere propitious for dialogue" in line with resolution 2797 (2025). Frente POLISARIO responded, reiterating its position that it was Morocco that had violated the ceasefire in November 2020, leaving Frente POLISARIO "no other option" but to resume "its legitimate armed struggle in self-defence".

18. On 2 January 2026, MINURSO, with assistance from the Mine Action Service, investigated an alleged drone strike by the Royal Moroccan Army that had occurred on 31 December against a vehicle approximately 130 km north of the Mijek team site, in the vicinity of an artisanal gold mining area. The Mission observed evidence consistent with the reported strike, including missile fragments and vehicle debris; no casualties occurred.

19. On 3 February, the Force Commander wrote to the parties calling for a cessation of hostilities during the holy month of Ramadan. The Royal Moroccan Army responded, reiterating its position (see para. 17), while Frente POLISARIO did not respond.

20. On 5 May, one firing incident took place in Smara in an area where civilians were present. A MINURSO patrol investigated the incident and located two impact craters and debris, including one near a detention facility. The debris caused injuries to one civilian and material damage around the impact site. The Special Representative and the Force Commander wrote to Frente POLISARIO to express concern and stress the importance of avoiding any action that could jeopardize the political process. The Personal Envoy also expressed concern regarding the potential impact of the incident on the political process, underscoring that "this is a time for dialogue and negotiations, not a time for military escalation". The United States condemned the attack, stating that "these actions are inconsistent with the spirit of the recent talks". Other Member States echoed concerns that such attacks risked undermining the political process.

21. In separate letters addressed to MINURSO and to the Secretary-General, Frente POLISARIO reiterated its position that it was exercising its "legitimate right to self-defense and resistance". On 13 May, Frente POLISARIO announced the establishment of a Sahrawi Military Office for Monitoring Compliance with International Humanitarian Law and the introduction of a "code of conduct" for their military and security formations.

22. On 5 June, MINURSO investigated two alleged drone strikes by the Royal Moroccan Army in the Mijek area, where artisanal gold mining activities take place. The Mission located two damaged civilian vehicles bearing Sahrawi registration plates and assessed that the damage was consistent with having been hit by drone-piloted missiles. MINURSO also received reports of an alleged incident on 4 June, approximately 10 km north-west of the drone strike locations, in which a civilian vehicle had reportedly been struck by 23 mm cannon fire. The vehicle had been removed from the area before the arrival of the MINURSO investigation patrol, and the report could not be verified.

23. On 7 June, MINURSO received reports from Frente POLISARIO of a separate drone strike in the Mijek area that reportedly resulted in the deaths of three Frente POLISARIO military officers, including Lahbib Mohamed Abdelziz, a Frente POLISARIO military and political leader and son of the late Secretary-General of Frente POLISARIO, Mohamed Abdleziz. MINURSO did not receive security clearances from Frente POLISARIO to investigate the alleged incident. On 10 June, the Personal Envoy again expressed concern that military actions from any side risked jeopardizing the progress made towards a lasting, mutually acceptable solution to the conflict.

III. Activities of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

A. Operational activities

24. The Special Representative, in addition to holding regular meetings with the Moroccan Coordinator in Laayoune and Rabat, met with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Morocco in Rabat on 12 November 2025 and on 18 May 2026. In October 2025 and April 2026, the Special Representative met with the Frente POLISARIO Coordinator in New York. The Special Representative also provided regular briefings to Member States in Rabat and New York.

25. During the reporting period, MINURSO continued strengthening coordination and cooperation with the Royal Moroccan Army. The Force Commander visited the headquarters of the southern zone of the Army in Agadir in August 2025 and again in January and July 2026.

26. The Force Commander remained unable to establish direct contact with the military leadership of Frente POLISARIO, and all communication continued to be conducted through written correspondence. At the level of team sites east of the berm and in Rabouni, near Tindouf, Algeria, in-person interactions continued to take place with the Frente POLISARIO liaison officers. Three liaison meetings took place between MINURSO team site commanders and Frente POLISARIO military regional commanders and deputy commanders.

27. As at 15 August 2026, the military component of MINURSO consisted of 155 military personnel, of whom 27 (17%) were women. MINURSO continued to pursue efforts to improve gender parity among the military observers.

28. Between 1 October 2025 and 15 August 2026, MINURSO conducted ground patrols covering approximately 296,164 km. West of the berm, MINURSO conducted 8,076 visits to the headquarters, units, subunits, strong points and observation posts of the Royal Moroccan Army. The Royal Moroccan Army continued to advise MINURSO military observers not to visit forward units without an Army escort due to safety and security concerns. MINURSO continued patrolling in selected areas along the berm where no exchanges of fire were reported.

29. Between 1 October 2025 and 15 August 2026, MINURSO conducted 152 aerial reconnaissance flights west of the berm. Owing to safety and security concerns, those flights continued to operate at minimum distances of 5 km from the berm.

30. Between 1 October 2025 and 15 August 2026, the Royal Moroccan Army reported to MINURSO 129 firing incidents west of the berm, for most of which the impact points either could not be identified or were inaccessible to MINURSO. Apart from the incident in Smara (see para. 20), the incidents investigated by MINURSO occurred in remote areas and caused no significant damage.

31. MINURSO continued to observe uncrewed aerial vehicles at the Smara airport. On 18 June, the Force Commander wrote to the Royal Moroccan Army seeking clarification about its use of drones. In its response on 20 June, the Royal Moroccan Army did not provide specific details regarding its use of drones but noted that the rules of engagement for its units were to "resort to the use of force only in a proportionate manner, either in cases of self-defense or as a preventative measure against an imminent threat involving a 'confirmed risk of fatality'". On several occasions, MINURSO also observed uncrewed aerial vehicles flying over its team sites. On 12 January, after one such sighting over its team site in Mahbas, MINURSO requested clarifications from the parties, both of which denied responsibility.

32. East of the berm, MINURSO continued to conduct ground patrols twice per week, accompanied by Frente POLISARIO. Frente POLISARIO continued to restrict MINURSO ground patrol movements to a 20 km distance from each team site. In Tifariti and Mijek, MINURSO ground patrols were further limited to specific approved routes. Frente POLISARIO has not permitted MINURSO helicopter reconnaissance flights east of the berm since November 2020.

33. MINURSO continued to investigate alleged aerial strikes by the Royal Moroccan Army at locations east of the berm. The reporting period saw a significant decrease in the number and intensity of incidents investigated, with only four alleged drone strikes investigated, three of which caused damage to vehicles and no casualties, while a fourth investigation did not find evidence that a strike had occurred. Four additional strikes against the Frente POLISARIO military were reported by local media sources, but Frente POLISARIO either did not confirm the incident or did not give MINURSO permission to investigate.

B. Mine action

34. The presence of unexploded ordnance and explosive remnants of war remained a significant concern and a threat to United Nations personnel and assets. From 1 October 2025 to 30 September 2026, MINURSO Mine Action Service demining teams conducted 1,330 missions to ensure the safe movement of MINURSO civilian and military personnel and logistics convoys and to provide technical expertise during the investigation of uncrewed aerial vehicle strikes. As at 15 August, the teams had assessed 12,401 km of routes between various team sites east of the berm as free from visible explosive ordnance. The Mine Action Service also verified as free from explosive hazards the 374 km of routes used by MINURSO investigation teams to visit the sites of alleged aerial and artillery strikes, as well as the surrounding areas. Additionally, the Mine Action Service carried out minefield clearance alongside non-technical survey activities and successfully cleared 1,794,124 m² of land.

35. As at 15 August, 24 out of 68 known minefields and 31 out of 543 recorded cluster strike areas had yet to be cleared from explosive ordnance hazards east of the berm. Since 1 October 2025, the Mine Action Service had located and destroyed one

landmine, 135 cluster munitions and six pieces of explosive ordnance. One unrecorded new minefield was identified and reported for future clearance operations.

36. From 1 October 2025 to 30 July 2026, the Royal Moroccan Army informed MINURSO that it had cleared nearly 268.97 million m² of land west of the berm of explosive ordnance hazards and had destroyed 44 anti-personnel mines, 5 anti-tank mines and 264 pieces of explosive ordnance.

37. The Mine Action Service maintained close coordination with Frente POLISARIO through the Sahrawi Mine Action Coordination Office, resulting in the expansion of access within 8 km of the berm and the establishment of a vital 7 km corridor for critical clearance operations near primary mine belts.

38. The Royal Moroccan Army reported seven explosive hazard accidents west of the berm, which caused 12 injuries and 1 fatality (12 military personnel and 1 civilian).

C. Challenges to the operations of the Mission

39. East of the berm, previous constraints on the MINURSO logistics, supply and maintenance chain eased considerably, enabling the Mission to better sustain its team sites. However, the deployment of MINURSO ground convoys remained subject to prior authorization from Frente POLISARIO on a “provisional and exceptional” basis.

40. The increasing unpaid assessed contributions to the special account for MINURSO led to a reduced deployment of military observers to 153 out of the approved strength of 218, affecting the number of ground patrols and other activities by the Mission. The Mission also had to reduce its mine action programme significantly as well as scale back its aviation fleet and dismiss one emergency helicopter crew, which stretched the Mission’s air operations and emergency services. Planned maintenance work at team sites had to be put on hold, with a negative impact on the working and living conditions of the Mission’s military observers.

D. Strategic review

41. Further to the Security Council’s request in resolution 2797 (2025), the Secretary-General appointed the Director of the Policy and Mediation Division in the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs to conduct a strategic review regarding the future mandate of MINURSO, taking into account the outcome of the negotiations. From 12 to 19 March, the Director met in New York with Morocco, Frente POLISARIO, Algeria and Mauritania, as well as members of the Council and relevant United Nations entities, before visiting the region from 24 March to 2 April. In Western Sahara, he consulted with all sections of MINURSO in Laayoune and visited MINURSO team sites, as well as the Tindouf Liaison Office, where he met with United Nations agencies providing assistance in the Sahrawi refugee camps. He also travelled to Rabat, Algiers and Nouakchott, where he engaged with relevant authorities, and to Rabouni, where he met with Frente POLISARIO representatives.

42. In the absence of a political outcome, he provided a preliminary assessment to the Security Council in closed consultations on 23 April, based on his visit to the region and engagements with relevant interlocutors. In his briefing, he cautioned against premature changes to the Mission’s structure or mandate while negotiations were ongoing.

IV. Humanitarian activities and human rights

A. Persons unaccounted for in the conflict

43. The question of persons still unaccounted for in relation to past hostilities continued to be a major humanitarian concern. The International Committee of the Red Cross remained ready to act as a neutral intermediary between the parties and play an advisory role on the issue.

B. Assistance for the protection of Western Saharan refugees

44. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the World Health Organization, with support from the Resident Coordinator Office, continued to provide humanitarian assistance to Sahrawi refugees in the five camps near Tindouf.

45. The first consolidated plan of needs and activities in the camps, the Sahrawi Refugee Response Plan 2024–2025, received $57.9 million of the nearly $104 million appealed for, namely 56% of the funding required. The Sahrawi Refugee Response Plan 2026–2027, launched in November 2025, seeks $179.3 million, including $89.6 million for 2026. As at 30 June 2026, approximately $15.2 million, or 17% of the funding required for 2026, had been received, including generous support from the Government of Algeria.

46. In partnership with the Algerian Red Crescent and UNHCR, WFP continued to provide food assistance to address the approximately 80% of the Sahrawi population who are food-insecure. Humanitarian assistance continued to fall short of household needs owing mainly to funding reductions. WFP continued to engage with the Government of Algeria on the possibility of procuring food commodities locally at negotiated, government-approved prices, to overcome increasing international commodity and transportation costs.

47. Global acute malnutrition, stunting and anaemia among Sahrawi children in the camps near Tindouf continued to increase, raising concerns about a potential nutrition emergency. Additionally, according to UNICEF, around 30,000 children under the age of 5 remained at risk of disruptions to routine immunization. Continued reliance on refugee volunteer teachers also threatened the continued provision of education services for children in the camps.

C. Confidence-building measures

48. The confidence-building measures, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1282 (1999) and subsequent resolutions, to allow family links between Sahrawi refugees in the Tindouf camps and their communities of origin in Western Sahara remain on hold.

49. The Personal Envoy has advocated for the expansion of confidence-building measures in the context of the renewed political process. He believes that the trust deficit between the parties remains a constant obstacle in the search for a mutually acceptable solution, and that a comprehensive set of trust-building initiatives would render a mutually acceptable solution more feasible. Concretely, he proposed, with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, individual and voluntary "go and see visits" for Sahrawi refugees to Laayoune and Dakhla, so that they might be better informed about the conditions in Western Sahara and the details of the

autonomy proposal made by Morocco. This initiative was brought to the attention of Frente POLISARIO on 2 September via a co-signed letter by the Personal Envoy, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations. In its response letter dated 14 September, Frente POLISARIO expressed its readiness to cooperate with UNHCR in facilitating the execution of the proposed initiative.

D. Human rights

50. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has not been granted access to the Territory since 2015 despite repeated requests made by the Office for a technical visit. The lack of independent, impartial, comprehensive and sustained human rights monitoring remained a significant obstacle to fully assessing the human rights situation on the ground. International observers, including parliamentarians, lawyers and journalists, reportedly continued to face entry restrictions, with dozens denied entry or expelled.

51. During the reporting period, OHCHR continued to receive reports of an increasingly shrinking civic space and restrictions on Sahrawis' rights to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly. Reports indicated that Sahrawi activists, including women and youth, were subjected to threats, intimidation and arbitrary arrests by Moroccan authorities, with many reportedly detained for several hours before being released without charge.

52. The situation of Sahrawi prisoners from the Gdeim Izik protest camp in Western Sahara, detained in Morocco, remained of concern. On 20 May 2026, the Committee against Torture issued decisions concerning four Sahrawi detainees linked to the camp, finding that the cases pointed to "a consistent pattern of arbitrary arrests, solitary confinement, acts of torture or ill-treatment during interrogations and the use of confessions obtained under duress in judicial proceedings".

53. On 30 April, the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism and the Independent Expert on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order sent a joint communication to the United States concerning a bill introduced on 24 June 2025. The bill would require the competent United States authorities to determine whether Frente POLISARIO met the applicable criteria for designation as a terrorist organization. The communication raised concerns regarding the bill's compatibility with international human rights obligations and its potential implications for humanitarian assistance and the United Nations-led political process.

54. In a note verbale to OHCHR dated 18 June, Morocco provided information relating to its cooperation with human rights mechanisms; measures taken to ensure the enjoyment of civil and political rights; and economic, social and cultural development. Morocco also raised concerns regarding alleged human rights violations in the Tindouf camps.

V. Financial aspects

55. The General Assembly, by its resolution 80/284 of 30 June 2026, appropriated the amount of $62.6 million for the maintenance of the Mission for the period from 1 July 2026 to 30 June 2027. In addition, the approved budget includes a voluntary contribution in kind in the amount of $0.5 million.

56. As at 20 August 2026, unpaid assessed contributions to the special account for MINURSO amounted to $80.3 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to $525 million.

57. Reimbursement of troop costs has been made for the period up to 31 March 2026 and for contingent-owned major equipment and self-sustainment for the period up to 30 September 2025.

VI. Consolidated conclusions and recommendations

58. As the conflict in Western Sahara enters its sixth decade, I am encouraged that the parties have resumed direct engagement for the first time in almost seven years. I welcome the renewed engagement of the United States and other Member States in support of a resolution of this long-standing conflict. I strongly urge the parties to seize this opportunity to advance towards a mutually acceptable political solution that will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in accordance with Security Council resolutions 2440 (2018), 2468 (2019), 2494 (2019), 2548 (2020), 2602 (2021), 2654 (2022), 2703 (2023), 2756 (2024) and 2797 (2025).

59. To this end, I call upon the parties to engage in concerted and good faith negotiations, under the auspices of my Personal Envoy, to explore the possibility of genuine autonomy for the people of Western Sahara, which could represent a most feasible outcome, in accordance with resolution 2797 (2025). The Personal Envoy's proposal for a framework agreement followed by a transitional period could allow for these negotiations to take place in the best conditions possible.

60. I wish to underscore that any proposal must be subject to a meaningful process of consultation with the people of Western Sahara, such that they have a free and voluntary choice to accept or reject it. This process of consultation is necessary to ensure that the people of Western Sahara are no longer denied their inalienable right to self-determination.

61. Given the long duration of this conflict, I strongly advocate strengthened and renewed international engagement by Member States and regional organizations to ensure that all agreements reached are supported through international guarantees for their full implementation, in accordance with international law. I also encourage the implementation of a comprehensive array of trust-building initiatives, as proposed by the Personal Envoy, to help overcome deep divisions that have consolidated over time.

62. I remain concerned about the situation in Western Sahara, where low-intensity hostilities have continued for nearly six years. It is now more important than ever that the parties cease hostilities and refrain from any actions that could undermine the prospects for a political solution, while ensuring the safety and security of MINURSO personnel and premises.

63. I remain especially concerned about the human rights situation in the Territory. I again call upon the parties to respect, protect and promote the human rights of all people in Western Sahara, including by ensuring access to justice and accountability for human rights violations and increasing their cooperation with OHCHR and the United Nations human rights mechanisms. Independent, impartial, comprehensive and sustained monitoring of the human rights situation remains necessary to ensure the protection of all people in Western Sahara.

64. While a mutually acceptable solution that provides for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara is being negotiated, it is imperative that the parties refrain from any action that could undermine fragile trust and hinder progress in the

political process. Any attack must be avoided at all costs, and a ceasefire must be fully re-established without delay. Until a mutually acceptable political solution is reached, MINURSO, through its monitoring, investigating and liaison with the parties, continues to play a critical role in preventing an escalation of hostilities. Therefore, pending a mutually acceptable resolution of the conflict, I recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of MINURSO for another year, until 31 October 2027, while taking into account developments in the political process. Without MINURSO to monitor, investigate and report on any incidents in the Territory and engage with the parties to defuse tensions, the risk of an escalation of hostilities would increase sharply, as would the possibility of spillover in an already volatile region.

65. I would like to express my appreciation to the Mission's troop-contributing countries for their support for the efforts by MINURSO to achieve gender balance among its military observers. The increased participation of women in peacekeeping improves the performance of United Nations peace operations and strengthens their effectiveness.

66. I commend my Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, Staffan de Mistura, for his continuing efforts. I also thank my Special Representative for Western Sahara and Head of MINURSO, Alexander Ivanko, as well as the outgoing MINURSO Force Commander, Major General Md. Fakhrul Ahsan, for their dedicated leadership of MINURSO. Lastly, I thank the women and men of MINURSO for their continued commitment, under difficult and challenging circumstances, to fulfilling the Mission's mandate.


Annex

United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara military and police strength as at 19 August 2026

	Military component				*Police component*	
Country	*Experts on mission*	*Staff*	*Troops*	*Total*	*Formed police units*	*Individual police officers*
Argentina	2	–	–	2	–	–
Austria	3	–	–	3	–	–
Bangladesh	6	–	–	6	–	–
Bhutan	2	–	–	2	–	–
Brazil	6	–	–	6	–	–
Chad	3	–	–	3	–	–
China	11	–	–	11	–	–
Colombia	2	–	–	2	–	–
Côte d’Ivoire	2	–	–	2	–	–
Croatia	4	–	–	4	–	–
Djibouti	0	–	–	0	–	–
Ecuador	2	–	–	2	–	–
Egypt	14	–	–	14	–	–
El Salvador	2	–	–	2	–	–
France	2	–	–	2	–	–
Germany	3	–	–	3	–	–
Ghana	5	–	3	8	–	–
Guinea	4	–	–	4	–	–
Honduras	8	–	–	8	–	–
Hungary	5	–	–	5	–	–
India	3	–	–	3	–	–
Indonesia	3	–	–	3	–	–
Ireland	0	–	–	0	–	–
Italy	2	–	–	2	–	–
Jordan	0	–	–	0	–	–
Kazakhstan	4	–	–	4	–	–
Kyrgyzstan	1	–	–	1	–	–
Malaysia	6	–	–	6	–	–
Malawi	2	–	–	2	–	–
Mexico	3	–	–	3	–	–
Mongolia	3	–	–	3	–	–
Montenegro	1	–	–	1	–	–
Nepal	4	–	–	4	–	–
Nigeria	5	–	–	5	–	–
Pakistan	9	–	–	9	–	–
Poland	1	–	–	1	–	–
Republic of Korea	3	–	–	3	–	–
Russian Federation	9	–	–	9	–	–

	Military component				*Police component*	
Country	*Experts on mission*	*Staff*	*Troops*	*Total*	*Formed police units*	*Individual police officers*
Sierra Leone	1	–	–	1	–	–
Sri Lanka	2	–	–	2	–	–
Sweden	0	–	–	0	–	–
Switzerland	2	–	–	2	–	–
Togo	2	–	–	2	–	–
United States of America	1	–	–	1	–	–
Total	**153**	**0**	**3**	**156**	**0**	**0**

Map



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